Remote Access Trojan (RAT) is a type of malware that, as the name suggests, can remotely access a victims’ system after successful infection. This blog is about one such RAT, RomCom RAT which can take complete control of a compromised system by spoofing and deploying fake versions of legitimate applications on the victims’ system to gain initial trust. 

Let us get into the details of one of the samples which drops a malicious RomCom RAT binary. This sample was digitally signed by Noray Consulting Ltd. On further analysis, we observed that Noray Consulting Ltd had a dummy LinkedIn page and a dubious website to deceive the victims.

Figure 1-Digital signature of the sample

Figure 1 shows the digital sign and the name of the signer. 

Figure 2-File payloads of our sample

It was observed that the setup file drops RomCom files in C:\Users\Public\Libraries. We observed that all DLLs dropped were VMProtect’ed files.

Figure 3-VMProtect packed payload file

From Figure 3, we can see that the dropped file netid7*.dll0 has high entropy and is a VMProtect’ed file.

Figure 4-Malicious binary accessing PEB

Here we can observe that the malware accesses the Process Environment Block (PEB) using gs:60h, after getting access to which, it checks for the OS Build number using rax+120h 

Figure 5-Is the process being debugged check

Then the current process is checked if it is being run under a debugger.

Figure 6-IsProcessorFeaturePresent

It then uses IsProcessorFeaturePresent, the argument 0x17 is passed to check if the __fastfail option is available or not.

Figure 7-Anti Debug Check

Here, QueryPerformanceCounter is being used for anti-debug techniques. When a process is being debugged there is a delay between instruction and execution. By using QueryPerformanceCounter we can measure the delay taken to run each instruction.

Figure 8-Calling GetOEMCP

In the above figure, we can see that GetOEMCP is used, which returns the OEM code page identifier of the Operating System.

Figure 9-Locale based exclusion

The malware then checks if the code page identifier is one of zh-CN, zh-TW, ko-KR, ja-JP. This is done to check if there is any clipboard data related to Chinese, Japanese or Korean language. If it is in one of these locales, the malware process throws an exception and terminates.

Figure 10-Environment variable

The sample under consideration has the ability to set an Environment Variable, it has been observed that malware tends to bypass the normal order of loading a DLL and loading it from another location.

Figure 11-Decrypting Function

The malware keeps all the static data like url, client header, registry value, filename encrypted, which is decrypted as shown in Figure 11.

For example 

Encrypted filename –

3B 20 54 18 7E 4F 8C 7F 70 20 5D 18 22 4F 86 7F 70 20 41 18 0C 4F 

Decryption key –

08 20 24 18 0C 4F E3 7F

The decrypted filename –


Encrypted Rundll32 path – 

1B 5A 05 49 6F 95 80 90 2F 13 05 4D 7F 88 90 9A 35 53 6B 42 74 8E 8A 9B 34 0C 6A 2C 28 9E 9C 9A 78 

Decryption key –

58 60 59 1E 06 FB E4 FF

Decrypted Rundll32 path –


Encrypted string –

7B 20 2C 16 67 FF 92 7F 7C 20 34 16 63 FF 81 7F 6F 20 2D 16 63 FF CE 7F 66 20 3D 16 72 FF E0 7F

Decryption key-

08 20 58 16 06 FF E0 7F

Decrypted string – s.t.a.r.t.l.e.a.g.u.e…n.e.t

Basic XOR encryption/decryption is at play here.

Figure 12-Obtaining proxy configuration if any

WinHttpGetIEProxyConfigForCurrentUser API is used to get the Internet Explorer proxy configuration for the current user. Then using this the malware can exfiltrate data gathered from the victim.

Figure 13-Establishing C2 connection

Here, we can observe that it’s decrypting “” using the decryption function mentioned in Figure 11.

Figure 14-File download

RomCom RAT uses WinHttpReadData API to download any file which is pushed by the C2. 

Figure 15-RDP connection check

The malware tries to check if any active RDP session is live using the API  ProcessIdToSessionId then proceeds to use the retrieved session ID to establish connection.

Figure 16-C2 Connection

In Figure 16 we can observe that this RomCom RAT is trying to connect to C2. However, if the connection is not established then there is a sleep time before checking again.

Figure 17-Performing local reconnaissance

It traverses the file system using FindFirstFileA, FindNextFileA and collects a list of filenames and sends it to C2.

Figure 18-Eyeing list of running processes

It uses CreateToolHelp32Snapshot and then iterates through the process using Process32FirstW and Process32NextW which is used to list all the running processes.

It has been observed that in a number of instances RomCom threat actors have used fake websites and applications to do its malicious activity.

We at K7 Labs provide detection for RomCom RAT and all the latest threats. Users are advised to use a reliable security product such as “K7 Total Security” and keep it up-to-date to safeguard their devices.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

HashDetection Name
007A67BFA732084B3F8278B302BEF49ETrojan ( 005a54be1 )
6F47723E5FC6E96AB5E9F96F6BC585FATrojan ( 00566ad51 )
46AC4B26D35F619D8A1415B5E4365A52Trojan ( 005a3e761 )



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